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Hypothetical Jurisdiction and
Interjurisdictional Preclusion:
A "Comity" of Errors'
I. INTRODUCTION
When people hear the term "federal subject matter jurisdiction," they do not
usually come running enthusiastically toward the conversation. Many find the
subject boring, complicated, or confusing.2 For whatever reason, they just do not
want to deal with it. This perception is not limited to cocktail party conversation
topics; it is manifest even in the federal courts themselves. The doctrine of
"hypothetical jurisdiction"3 is a product of the tendency to avoid the topic: when
there is a difficult issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the courts will simply move
right past it to other, more interesting-or at least easier-issues.4 Despite the fact
that the prerequisite of subject matter jurisdiction is a constitutional mandate,5 the
exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction has recently become widespread through the
federal court system.6 In 1998, the Supreme Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
I. The term "comity" is synonymous with "civility," see 15 C.J.S. Comity (1967), and refers to the
voluntary, mutual respect with which states treat the laws of other states, see 16 Am. JUR. 2D Conflicts of
Laws § 17 (1998). This part of the title derives from one of William Shakespeare's earliest plays, The
Comedy of Errors. See WILLiAM SHAKESPEARE, COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS I (William Allan Neilson
& Charles Jarvis Hill eds., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1970).
2. See JOSEPH W. GLANN N, CIVIL PROCEDURE, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 120 (3d ed. 1997)
("[Tlhe potential for confusing [personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue] is great.").
3. Although different courts refer to the doctrine by other names, such as "assumed appellate
jurisdiction" and "the Norton Doctrine," the Supreme Court accepted and used the term "hypothetical
jurisdiction" in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). The Court
purported to derive the denomination from the Ninth Circuit, but the phrase apparently originated from a
student written law review article, Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits
of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 713 (1979). See Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of
Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 237 n.4 (1999).
4. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 237.
5. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I. This clause defines the limits of the federal judicial power:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
6. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 237.
Better Environment recognized the impropriety of federal courts adjudicating the
merits of a claim without resolving the issue of whether the court lacks power to
hear the case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution.7 However, the
Court soon qualified this holding as one which prevents only adjudication on the
merits, and not on other procedural issues, before establishing subject matter
jurisdiction.' Some courts failed altogether to recognize the repudiation and
continued to rely on the traditional doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction.9 This
avoidance among federal courts of the basic holding in Steel Co. illustrates just
how elusive the issue of federal subject matter jurisdiction can be and, therefore,
how attractive and persistent the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction can be.' °
The problem with federal courts assuming jurisdiction while ruling on other
issues appears in the form of another cocktail party faux pas: interjurisdictional
preclusion." Under this doctrine, once a federal court rules on an issue, the state
courts are bound to afford full faith and credit to that ruling. 2 If the federal court
did not have proper jurisdiction over the controversy in the first place, the
preclusive effect of its judgement would be offensive to the various states'
sovereignty. 3
This Comment will focus on the competing interests of the Third and Fourth
Articles of the Constitution: state autonomy and limitation of federal power on the
one hand, judicial economy on the other, respectively. Part II will trace the
historical origins and development of hypothetical jurisdiction and
interjurisdictional preclusion. 4 Part III will outline the current state of the law
regarding these concepts as they have surfaced in several recent Supreme Court
decisions.'5 Part IV will suggest a solution to the problem, 6 while Part V will
7. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 92.
8. See Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 594, 577-78 (1999) (holding that an issue of
personal jurisdiction may be decided before establishing jurisdiction over the subject matter); Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 837 (1999) (holding that the issue of class certification may be decided
before a determination of subject matter jurisdiction).
9. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 314-15 nn.337-38.
10. Seeid.at314.
11. See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 734 (1986) ("Fashioning a law of
preclusion ... is considerably more difficult in an interjurisdictional context."); Howard M. Erichson,
lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945,946 (1998) ("Res Judicata is hard enough already.
Consider it at the interjurisdictional level, and we are asking for headaches."). These sentiments illustrate
the complex nature of interjurisdictional preclusion. Considering that this concept is only half of the
equation involved in an exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction, it is easy to see why courts would rather not
grapple with such a difficult subject. However, as the cases examined later in this Comment will show, the
importance of the constitutional boundaries from which these complicated subjects grew is such that the
courts have repeatedly been confronted with these issues. See infra Part III.
12. See Burbank, supra note 11, at 741-43 (quoting Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1983)).
13. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 145 F.3d 211,216 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Ruhrgas A.G.
v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999). These cases will be discussed in depth infra Part III.B..
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
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briefly conclude. 7
The exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction-passing over the issue of Article III
standing-on the part of the federal courts is a problem mainly because of the effect
of interjurisdictional preclusion." The federal judiciary has made an
understandable, if not noble, attempt to dispose of cases in the most efficient
manner by assuming jurisdiction of the subject matter. However, the preclusive
effect of this practice threatens both the judicial autonomy of the states and the
very notion of the separation of powers that is essential to the maintenance of a
democratic government. 9 To reconcile these two important concerns, this
Comment will suggest that to which the Supreme Court has only eluded: in certain
circumstances, federal courts should overlook questions of subject matter
jurisdiction and rule on other issues, without the ruling necessarily carrying a
preclusive effect in the courts of other jurisdictions.2" The state courts would still
have the opportunity to give effect to the judgements-and likely would, under the
principles of comity-while federal courts would have the opportunity to dispose
of their cases efficiently.
II. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION AND
INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION
The root of the controversy lies in the Constitution. The authors drafted
Article III, section 221 to limit the power of the federal judiciary.22 The framers
specifically enumerated the types of controversies that could be brought in federal,
"Article III," courts. 23 The purpose of this provision was to provide an impartial
national forum for litigants who might be subject to prejudice in a state court. 4
17. See infra Part V.
18. See Burbank, supra note II and accompanying text.
19. See CHARLES DE MONIESQUIEU, THE SPIRITOF LAWS (1748), reprinted in DOUGLAS W. KimEc &
STPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSITIrITrONAL ORDER, HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY, 333-34
(1998).
20. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) ("A final judgment in one State, if
rendered by a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the
judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the land.").
21. U.S.CONST.art.III,§2,cl. I.
22. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1962). Justice Harlan pointed out that
Article III granted federal courts the power to decide questions of state law only based on diversity of
citizenship. Id.
23. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
24. See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 289 (1888) (discussing the limited circumstances
in which federal jurisdiction exists).
As a corollary to Article III's limited grant of federal power, the framers sought
to preserve the state courts' power of general jurisdiction over unenumerated
subject matter.25 The retention of this power among the states guaranteed the
autonomy and dignity of the various states, and such limitation of federal power
was essential to the ratification of the Constitution itself.26
Congress restated and codified Article III's second section in Title 28 of the
United States Code.27 Section 1331 addresses the federal question aspect of Article
III,28 while section 1332 outlines the requirement of diversity of citizenship.29 The
fulfilment of either of these requirements allows a federal court to hear a case or
controversy.
Once a case is heard in federal court, the ruling of that court will preclude a
state court (or other federal court) from ruling on the same issue.3" This preclusion
principle is, like the requirement of subject matter jurisdiction,3 rooted in the
Constitution.32 The Full Faith and Credit Clause contained within section one of
Article IV essentially mandated that each state's courts give full faith and credit
to a ruling in any other state's courts. 3  Because this provision was silent on the
effect that a federal court's ruling would have on the states' courts, Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1738 3' This legislation expanded the Full Faith and Credit
25. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 537; United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96
(1980) (noting the role Article III plays in limiting and defining federal court jurisdiction).
26. See THE FEDERALISTNOS. 80-82 (Alexander Hamilton); cf. HERBERTJ. STORING, WHATTHE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 22-23 (1981), reprinted in DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE
AMERICAN CONSITInONALORDER, HISTORY, CASES,AND PHILOSOPHY 177-78 (1998). Storing chronicled
the struggle between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists that occurred during the drafting of the
Constitution. Ironically, the Federalists took the position that the people and the individual states should
retain more power, while the Anti-Federalists were for a more powerful federal government. See 1 Annals
of Cong., 729-31 (1789), reprinted in DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN
CONSiTrlUYONALORDER, HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY 177 (1998) (indicating that the Anti-Federalists
were in favor of a stronger federal government and more specific enumeration of rights, which eventually
became the Bill of Rights).
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1994).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional
parties;
(4) a foreign State, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different
States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
31. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
33. See id.
34. See28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
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Clause to apply to rulings in federal courts as well.35 The original purpose of the
Clause, and Congress' extension thereof, was to prevent relitigation of issues
already adjudicated in a proper forum.36
A. The Constitutional Framework
1. Article III
The framers of the United States Constitution borrowed heavily from
Montesquieu's notion of the separation of powers.37 Montesquieu warned that too
much power in the hands of one branch of government- judicial, executive, or
legislative-can upset the balance of power necessary to maintain a democratic
government.38 This concept of a limitation of power lies in the text of Article III
of the Constitution.3 9
Article III, section 2 provides the federal court system with several
jurisdictional hurdles.' The first limitation is that courts can only hear justiciable
"cases" or "controversies."4' Barriers to justiciability within this requirement are
the doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness.42 For a litigant to have standing
to sue, she must "allege that she has suffered or will imminently suffer an injury,
35. See id. The modem full faith and credit statute provides, in pertinent part: "judicial proceedings
... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory, or Possession from which
they are taken." Id. This clause has been interpreted to require State courts to give full faith and credit to
judgments within federal courts. See Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153
(5th Cir. 1974) (citing Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938)); Thompson v. D'Angelo, 320 A.2d 729,734
(Del. 1974) (citing Hancock Nat'l Bank v. Farnum, 179 U.S. 640 (1900)).
36. See Robart Wood & Wire Prods. Corp. v. Namaco Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986)
(citing Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935), which suggested that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was
enacted to codify the common law tradition that once ajudgement is rendered in one court, "that judgement
shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in the court in which the judgement
was rendered"). In addition to this purpose of judicial economy, the congressional intent of the full faith
and credit statute was to unify the courts within the American system of government. See Americana of
Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431,438 (3d Cir. 1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
37. See MONMSQUIEU, supra note 19, at 334.
38. See DoUGLAs W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSiTIUTONAL ORDER 334-37
(1998).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
40. See id.
41. Id. We need not draw a distinction between "cases" and "controversies" for the purposes of this
comment, although some fine distinctions may exist. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v.
Haworth, Missouri, 300 U.S. 227,239-41 (1937) (noting that controversies are only suits of a civil nature).
42. KMIEC &PRESSER, supra note 38, at 347.
that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct, and that a favorable
court decision is likely to redress the injury."43 Courts determine the ripeness of
a case based on the hardship to the parties that a denial of judicial review will
cause and the fitness of the case for judicial review.' Finally, a case may be
dismissed as moot if the personal interest of the plaintiff ceases to exist. 5
Congress codified certain aspects of Article III with the enactments of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.' Section 1331, governing "Federal Question
Jurisdiction," grants to the federal district courts jurisdiction of civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.4 Section
1332, governing "Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction," gives the district courts
jurisdiction to hear cases between citizens of different states. 8 In the name of
judicial economy, Congress also enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, governing
"Supplemental Jurisdiction," which gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear purely
state claims that arise from the same common nucleus of operative facts as a
legitimate federal claim. 49  This body of law illustrates the rather narrow
jurisdictional parameters within which the framers and Congress defined the
limits of federal judicial power.
2. Article IV
In drafting the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV, the framers sought
to establish the common law principle that a judgment rendered in one court shall
be conclusive of the rights of the litigants in every other court.' This clause had
both an economical effect on the federal judiciary, by preventing the relitigation
of issues already decided in court,5 and a unifying effect on the nation, by
mandating respect of judgments between the individual sister states. 2
The Full Faith and Credit Clause in the Constitution speaks only to the
respect that courts of each state must afford each other. 3 The Clause is silent on
how much faith and credit the states should afford federal tribunals and how much
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 28U.S.C.§§ 1331, 1332 (1994).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1986).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994) ("[Tlhe district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."). There are some important
exceptions within 28 U.S.C. § 1367 that need not be discussed in this Comment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(1994).
50. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943).
51. See infra Part II.C.
52. See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1951).
53. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the ... judicial
proceedings of every other State.").
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the federal courts should afford the states.' Congress therefore enacted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738-the "Full Faith and Credit statute"-in order to extend this salutary rule to
reach the federal judiciary as well.55
The principle of full faith and credit is distinguishable from the doctrine of
comity. While the full faith and credit referred to in Article IV and 28 U.S.C. §
1738 are, respectively, constitutional and congressional mandates imposed upon
the national court system,56 comity is the voluntary regard that the courts of one
jurisdiction afford to the judgments of others. 7 Although the exercise of comity
is said to be a matter of the forum court's discretion, certain established rules of
comity constrain tribunals within that forum in their individual discretion.58
3. Personal Jurisdiction
One final jurisdictional hurdle is useful to examine in the context of this
Comment: personal jurisdiction. Before any court, state or federal, can compel a
litigant to appear, the court must establish jurisdiction over the person (in
personam jurisdiction).59 In personam jurisdiction exists where a person has
"minimum contacts" with the forum state.'
The requirement of personal jurisdiction derives from the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment6 and is based on principles of fundamental
fairness.62 Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, however, parties to the suit can
waive the requirement of personal jurisdiction.63
B. The Rise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction
"The first question necessarily is that of jurisdiction."' In the 1868 case of
Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme Court stated that without first resolving the
54. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
56. See U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
57. See 16 AM. JuR.2o Conflict of Laws §§ 14-17 (1998).
58. See id. § 17; Brown v. Perry, 156 A. 910, 913 (Vt. 1931).
59. GLANNON, supra note 2, at 3.
60. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
62. See id.; Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.
63. See GLANNON, supra note 2, at 5-6; see also FED. R. Ctr. P. 12(b)(1) (stating that failure to raise
a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction waives any objection to the court's jurisdiction).
64. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 512 (1868).
question of proper jurisdiction over the subject matter, "it is useless, if not
improper, to enter into any discussion of other questions."65 In McCardle, the
Court dismissed an appeal from a prisoner under a writ of habeas corpus because
Congress previously repealed the Act under which the prisoner sought the writ.'
The Court concluded that when Congress repealed the Act which formed the basis
of the Court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the court no longer had the authority
to do anything but dismiss the case.67
More recently, other courts declined to make such a broad concession,
succumbing to the temptation to rule on issues they deem easily resolved. The
lower federal courts seriously eroded the principle asserted in McCardle, that
subject matter jurisdiction necessarily represents the first hurdle to confront.68 In
1981, the Ninth Circuit in Nance v. EPA confronted a case that involved merits
less complicated than the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.69 The court
concluded that the claim was "so patently without merit that the standing question
can be left for another day."'7 By the middle of the 1990's, every federal court of
appeals adopted this procedure of skipping over difficult issues of subject matter
jurisdiction in favor of more easily resolved issues.7"
To justify the practice of hypothetical jurisdiction, the circuit courts relied
primarily on two Supreme Court cases.72 The first was Secretary of Navy v.
Avrech.73 In Avrech, the Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte.74 However, before the Court reached the jurisdictional issue, it
conclusively decided the merits of Avrech in the companion case of Parker v.
Levy.75 The Court subsequently disposed of Avrech on the merits, citing the
futility of arguing the jurisdictional issue where the merits had already been
decided in another case.76
The second and more widely discussed case77 principally relied upon in the
exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction is Norton v. Matthews.78 In Norton, the Court
65. Id. at 512.
66. Id. at 515.
67. Id. ("[Tihis court cannot proceed to pronounce judgment in this case, for it has no longer
jurisdiction of the appeal; and judicial duty is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction
than in exercising firmly that which the Constitution and the laws confer.").
68. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 236-37, 245-47.
69. 645 F.2d701 (9thCir. 1981).
70. Id. at 716.
71. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 235.
72. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1998).
73. 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
74. See id. at 677.
75. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 98.
76. Avrech, 418 U.S. at 678 ("[E]ven the most diligent and zealous advocate could find his ardor
somewhat dampened in arguing ajurisdictional issue where the decision on the merits is... foreordained.").
77. See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 3, at 299. Professor Idleman refers, in section IIB. of his article,
to the "Norton Doctrine," suggesting the doctrinal proportions of this landmark case.
78. 427 U.S. 524 (1976).
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faced the jurisdictional issue of whether a case was properly before a three-judge
panel or whether it should have been heard by an ordinary district court.79 The
Court, like the Court in Avrech, decided the merits question in a companion case.
That case was Matthews v. Lucas, the disposal of which rendered the jurisdictional
issue in Norton moot.' A determination in that case of the jurisdictional issue had
no effect on the ultimate outcome of the case."'
Drawing from this line of cases, the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction
evolved to contain specific, identifiable elements. In order to bypass the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction and proceed directly to the merits of a case, five
conditions must be met: 1) the merits must be substantially easier to resolve than
the jurisdictional issue; 2) the resolution of the merits must be against the party
alleging jurisdiction; 3) the jurisdictional issue must be particularly complex; 4)
the implications of deciding the jurisdictional issue must be far-reaching; and 5)
the record or briefing must be inadequate to decide the jurisdictional issue. 2 Each
of these requirements, except for the fourth, seems to stem from a desire to foster
judicial economy. The fourth requirement, that the implications of deciding the
jurisdictional issue be far-reaching, has the paradoxical objective of judicial
restraint. If a decision on the issue will have far-reaching implications in terms
of the impact it will have on similar cases brought in other courts, the court
exercises judicial restraint by passing on that issue. However, there is little
restraint in foregoing one far-reaching issue in favor of another. The infectious
effect of the exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction in itself proves to be far reaching,
as every federal circuit eventually applied the doctrine.83
The federal courts' interest in resolving cases based on their most easily
resolved issues was not without reason. From the standpoint ofjudicial economy,
the effort was noble. Congress promulgated its own remedy for the inefficiencies
of allowing cases to be divided among different fora with the enactment of 28
U.S.C. § 1367.' This supplemental jurisdiction provision allows claims that could
normally be brought only in state court to be heard by the federal court if they arise
from the same common nucleus of operative facts as a claim that is properly before
the federal court.8" However, judicial economy is not the sole end of the federal
79. See id. at 528-29.
80. See 427 U.S. 495,531 (1976).
81. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,98 (1998).
82. Idleman, supra note 3, at 252; Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327,333 (D.C. Cir.
1991), abrogated by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
83. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 237.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
85. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
judiciary.8 6 The effect of hypothetical jurisdiction has been to deny state courts the
autonomy that Congress, as well as the framers of the Constitution, sought to
preserve. In addition, litigants who otherwise would be entitled to have their cases
heard in their particular state's court have had this right pulled away from them.
The exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction, as tempting as it may be for federal
judges, has caused more problems than it has solved.87
C. The Effect of Interjurisdictional Preclusion
There are two main types of preclusion that occur in our system of
jurisprudence: claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral
estoppel)." In addition, there are two directions that the preclusion can travel:
horizontally (from one state court to another) and vertically (between state and
federal courts).8 9 A brief examination of these terms will allow the narrowing and
focusing of the concepts for the purposes of this Comment.
Claim preclusion, or resjudicata, is a doctrine whereby a ruling on a claim in
court forever bars relitigation of the same claim.' The parties will be precluded
from relitigating an entire claim when the subsequent action involves: 1) the same
claim, arising out of the same transaction or occurrence;9 2) a trial on the merits;92
and 3) the same parties."3 The operative element for the purposes of this Comment
is the second requirement: a claim will not be precluded unless there has been a
trial on the merits. Before 1998, the scope of hypothetical jurisdiction as applied
in the federal courts allowed the preclusion of a claim decided on the merits by a
court that did not establish its Article III jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In 1998, the Supreme Court purported to repudiate the practice of hypothetical
jurisdiction with its decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.9
In Steel Co., the Court explicitly stated that courts must first resolve challenges to
subject matter jurisdiction before moving onto the merits of the case.95 This ruling
effectively eradicated the possibility of claim preclusion resulting from an exercise
of hypothetical jurisdiction. The Court also explicitly stated that a trial on the
86. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). ("[T]he fact that
a given law or procedure isefficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.").
87. See infra Part IV.
88. GLANNON, supra note 2, at 429-76.
89. Erichson, supra note 11, at 946.
90. GLANNON, supra note 2, at 430.
91. Id. at 431-32.
92. Id. at 432-33.
93. Id. at 433-34.
94. 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (stating that "hypotheticaljurisdiction produces nothing more than hypothetical
judgement"). See id. at 101. For a more in-depth discussion of the Court's decision in Steel Co., see infra
Part III.A.
95. Id. at 110 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (opining that "federal courts should be certain of their
jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case").
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merits may not take place without a prior establishment of proper subject matter
jurisdiction.' Therefore, since 1998, claim preclusion is no longer a concern in
the courts' exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction.97
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, on the other hand, calls for a separate
examination because its elements differ. Issue preclusion is a doctrine which
prevents litigants from revisiting, whether within the same claim or a different
claim: 1) an issue of fact or law;98 2) actually litigated and determined by;93) a
valid and final judgement;" 4) the determination of which is essential to the
judgement.' The economic purpose of this doctrine is similar to that of res
judicata in barring issues from relitigation. 12 However, collateral estoppel is
applied with more precision than the broader doctrine of res judicata.'03 Because
the "merits" requirement is lacking in the elements of collateral estoppel, there is
still a chance that an exercise of hypothetical jurisdiction on any issue other than
the "merits" will cause the subsequent preclusion of that issue in the future. In
Steel Co., the Supreme Court alluded to the possibility that there could still be
issues appropriately decided by a federal court before the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction."° This possibility became a reality in several recent cases. 1°5 While
hypothetical jurisdiction is not as prevalent as it was before 1998, the doctrine still
lives on in attenuated form.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION CASES
This part will offer analyses of several recent Supreme Court cases that
addressed various hypothetical jurisdiction issues. The first case this part will
examine is Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Environment, in which the Court held
that courts must first resolve issues of subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding
96. See Idelman, supra note 3, at 349.
97. Cf. id. at314-37. Professor Idleman indicated that federal judges have found several ways around
Steel Co. to continue to reach the merits without establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
98. GLANNON, supra note 2, at 463.
99. Id. at 463-64.
100. Id. at 464.
101. Id. at464-65.
102. Seeid. at461.
103. See id. at 462.
104. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1998) (citing Norton v. Matthews,
427 U.S. 524 (1976) and Sec't of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974) for examples of cases in which
the issues of law had already been clearly decided authoritatively and the jurisdictional issue was therefore
moot).
105. See infra Part III.
to the merits of the case. "0e The second case is Ruhrgas A. G. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
where the Court clarified that while courts must establish subject matter
jurisdiction before reaching the merits, courts may properly decide an issue of
personal jurisdiction before an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 7 Finally, this
part will discuss Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., in which the Court held that parties
may litigate the issue of class certification in federal court before establishing
proper Article III jurisdiction.° 8
A. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment 0 9
In 1998, the Supreme Court sought to put an end to the widespread practice
of hypothetical jurisdiction."' In Steel Co., an environmental group brought an
action against a steel manufacturer for alleged past failure to comply with the
reporting requirements of a federal law-the Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA)."' The district court held that because the
EPCRA did not authorize a citizen suit for past violations and there was no
allegation made that the steel manufacturer was presently in violation of the Act,
the environmental group lacked standing to bring the case before a federal court." 2
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that citizen suits may be brought under
EPCRA against violators who filed after the statutory deadline.' '3 In so ruling, the
court of appeals effectively addressed a substantive issue of the case: whether a
citizen cause of action against an EPCRA violator has merit with regard to past
violations.'
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Steel Co., stated that the need to
establish subject matter jurisdiction as a threshold matter was "inflexible and
without exception.""' (However, even Justice Scalia conceded that there are times
when a claim is so "completely devoid of merit" that a court may properly dismiss
106. 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). See infra Part III.A.
107. See infra Part IlI.B.
108. See infra Part III.C.
109. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
110. See id. at 101 (declaring that "hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical
judgement"). The Court said that this type of judgement amounted to an advisory opinion. Id. Advisory
opinions, those devoid of true authority, were disapproved of by the Court in Muskrat v. United States, 219
U.S. 346, 362 (1911). See id.
111. Id. at 86-88.
112. Id. at 83.
113. Id.
114. Cf infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens interpreted the issue as one of
procedure rather than merit, and merely concurred in the judgment. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 112-34
(detailing Justice Stevens' concurring opinion).
115. Id. at 95 (quoting Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
The Court also cited Ex Parte McCardle, 7 U.S. 506 (1868) and Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.
Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) for similar propositions of the primary nature of the jurisdictional issue. On
every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that ofjurisdiction, first, of this court, and
then of the lower court. Courts must ask and answer this question for themselves, even when not otherwise
suggested.
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the claim on that basis."6 ) The majority opinion, after rejecting Justice Stevens'
proposition that the EPCRA provision at issue was itselfjurisdictional, restated the
elements of Article III standing which confer the right to bring a case or
controversy before a federal court."'
In order to have standing there must be an injury in fact to the plaintiff
asserting the claim, the harm suffered must be neither hypothetical nor
conjectural, there must be sufficient causal relationship between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's injury, and there must be a likelihood that the relief
requested will redress the alleged injury."8 The Court in Steel Co. concluded that
the plaintiff did not have standing. "' It reasoned that the relief sought, mainly
declaratory, would not redress the injury caused by the defendant. Declaratory
relief was not warranted because the defendant did not dispute its failure to report
violations of the EPCRA. 2 ° Further, the Court rejected the plaintiffs circular
argument that the recovery of the cost of bringing suit was enough to confer
standing to bring suit.'' Justice Scalia stressed the importance of dismissing such
a suit for failure to pass this threshold test.'22 When a plaintiff lacks standing to
sue, the court lacks jurisdiction to review the merits of the case, no matter how
favorable a resolution might seem.'23
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, highlighted the majority's
concession that there are cases in which the merits are so clear that courts may
dispose of them before establishing jurisdiction. Justice O'Connor urged against
construing the majority's list of limited circumstances under which federal courts
could reserve judgment on a difficult question ofjurisdiction as exhaustive."24 The
concurring opinion adhered to the idea in Norton that gave rise to the doctrine of
hypothetical jurisdiction itself: when a court may resolve alternatively in favor of
the same party on the merits, the court may reserve judgement on the jurisdictional
116. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S.
661,666 (1974)). The Court in Oneida characterized the exception as existing when the claim before the
court is "so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely
devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy .... Oneida, 414 U.S. at 666.
117. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102-03.
118. Id. at 103.
119. Id. at 109 ("Having found that none of the relief sought by respondent would likely remedy its
alleged injury in fact, we must conclude that respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit ... .
120. Id. at 106.
121. Id. at 107-08 (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990), "An interest in
attorney's fees is... insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits
of the underlying claim.").
122. See id. at 103-04.
123. See id. at 109-10 (refusing to ignore the constitutional limits of separation of powers in favor of
resolving the case on its merits).
124. Seeid.atlO-11.
issue. "'
Justice Breyer also concurred in the judgement, admitting that courts should
decide Article III standing before the merits of a case. 2 6 However, Justice Breyer
cited a rise in the caseloads of federal judges as justification for allowing the
practice of hypothetical jurisdiction. '27 Similar to Justice O'Connor, Justice Breyer
took a more judicially active view of the role of federal judges. For Justice Breyer,
the Constitution does not impose a "rigid" order in which courts must hear
issues."' Justice Breyer's empirical evidence of an alarming rise in federal
judicial caseloads failed, however, to address or identify the cause of the increase.
In fact, the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction seemed to arise shortly after 197 1,
suggesting-in light of the rise in federal court caseloads since then-that its
application was not an adequate cure for judicial overload. 9 This contradictory
evidence suggests a cause-other than laboring over difficult issues of subject
matter jurisdiction-for the perceived delay in the administration of justice by the
federal judiciary.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, in which Justices Souter and Ginsberg
joined, framed the statutory "merits" question in Steel Co. as one of jurisdiction:
"whether ... [EPCRA] ... confers federal jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly
past violations."' 3 ° Justice Stevens argued that this standing issue was also in itself
a jurisdictional issue, and the lower court had discretion to treat it first.' 3' Justice
Stevens contended, however, that the Court would have jurisdiction to hear the
statutory question first, even if it were, as the majority saw it, a "cause of action"
question. 2 The concurring opinion suggested that the Court, by predicating its
Article III standing analysis on the fact that EPCRA allows citizen suits, practiced
its own ironic version of hypothetical jurisdiction. 3  Justice Stevens' main
argument was that the Court should decide a statutory question of jurisdiction
before focusing on the constitutional issue."3 The reasoning behind this opinion
is based on the policy that a court should avoid passing unnecessarily on an
undecided constitutional question. "' Justice Ginsberg agreed with this proposition
125. See id.
126. Id. at 111.
127. Id. at 111-12 (citing L. MEcHAM, JuDIciAL Bus EsS OF ThEUNrED STATES COURTS: 1996 REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR 16, 18,23; REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrED
STATES 106, 115, 143 (1971), suggesting more than a twofold increase in the number of cases filed per
appellate judgeship).
128. Id. at 111.
129. See id.; supra Part II.B
130. See id., 523 U.S. at 112 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 123-24.
132. Id. at 117-18 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Ilit is also possible to characterize the statutory issue..
.as whether respondent's complaint states a 'cause of action.' Framed this way.., we have the power to
decided the statutory question first.").
133. See id. at 123-24.
134. Id. at 112 (finding that under proper construction of EPCRA the Court should only determine the
jurisdictional issue, thereby leaving the constitutional issue for another day).
135. See id. at 124.
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in her brief concurring opinion because she preferred to reserve judgment on the
constitutional standing issue, instead resolving the case on the statutory standing
issue. "'
Although the opinions in this case were quite divergent regarding the
particulars of the statute involved, the Justices agreed upon the central holding in
Steel Co.: an issue of jurisdiction must be decided before the merits.'37
B. Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co. 1
38
The Fifth Circuit saw the Supreme Court's holding in Steel Co. as a
requirement that courts examine the issue of subject matter jurisdiction before any
other issue.'39 The Circuit Court therefore held that a federal court may not
dismiss a case for lack of personal jurisdiction without establishing proper Article
III standing."4 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, clarifying that Steel
Co. taught only that an examination of subject matter jurisdiction must come
before that of the merits, rather than before other jurisdictional issues. 4 ' This
section will explore the Fifth Circuit's attempt to absolutely repudiate hypothetical
jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's corresponding revival of some aspects of the
doctrine. Ruhrgas narrowed the Court's holding in Steel Co., and brought some
ideas from the concurring opinions in Steel Co. into the majority.'42
The facts of Ruhrgas are as follows. In the mid-1970's, Marathon Oil and its
affiliates began exploring North Sea gas reserves in the Heimdal gas field. "' A
Marathon affiliate entered into an agreement with Ruhrgas, Germany's primary
gas company, whereby Marathon would provide $300 million for drilling and
construction in return for Ruhrgas's guarantee of premium prices for Marathon's
European gas sales.'" When it became apparent that Ruhrgas would not honor its
promise, Marathon sued in Texas state court for fraud, misrepresentation, civil
136. Id. at 134 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) for the proposition that the Court should "resist expounding or offering
advice on the constitutionality of what Congress might have done, but did not do").
137. Id. at 109-10.
138. 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
139. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G. 115 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd, Ruhrgas, 526 U.S.
574 (1999).
140. Seeid. at318.
141. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 575.
142. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
143. The two affiliates of Marathon Oil named as plaintiffs in the present case are Marathon
International Oil and Marathon Petroleum Norge. Marathon Petroleum Norway is another affiliate that was
involved in the dispute, but was not party to the suit. See Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 317.
144. The affiliate that was actually a party to the agreement was Marathon Petroleum Norway, which
acquired rights to 24% of the Heimdal field. See id.
conspiracy, and tortious interference with business relations.'45 Ruhrgas removed
to federal court based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,'46 federal question
jurisdiction,'47 and federal arbitration jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 205.4
Ruhrgas then moved to stay all court proceedings due to a clause in the "Heimdal
Agreement" that claims were subject to binding arbitration in Europe.'49 The
district court denied the stay. Ruhrgas then filed a motion to dismiss based on
lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens 5 ° The Marathon
Plaintiffs moved to remand to state court based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.15
The district court granted Ruhrgas's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction; the court therefore dismissed all other motions as moot. 5 ' Ruhrgas
subsequently moved for reconsideration of the stay of proceedings pending
European arbitration.' The district court denied that motion as well, and both
parties appealed. 151
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that a court that lacks subject matter
jurisdiction cannot reach the issue of personal jurisdiction. 55 The court claimed
that, because one of the plaintiff affiliates was an alien corporation similar to the
defendant Ruhrgas, the lack of complete diversity destroyed the court's
jurisdiction.'56 The court vacated the judgement of the district court, and
instructed that the action be remanded to state court.
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the Fifth Circuit granted a
rehearing en banc. 1 ' The court then held that in removed cases, district courts
should first decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction. Only upon establishing
proper subject matter jurisdiction may courts examine personal jurisdiction
issues."' The court reasoned that subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental
constitutional limitation' 59 on federal judicial power.1"° Personal jurisdiction, on
145. Id. Marathon conducted business primarily in Houston, Texas.
146. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
148. See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1994); Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 317.
149. Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 317 n.4.
150. Id. at 317.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999).
155. Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 145 F.3d 211,214 (5th Cir. 1998).
156. Marathon Oil, 115 F.3d at 319 n. 14. The court relied upon Giannakos v. M/VBravo Trader, 762
F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985), which held that "[d]iversity does not exist where aliens are on both sides of the
litigation." See id.
157. See Marathon Oil, 145 F.3d at215.
158. See id. at 214.
159. U.S. CoNsT. art. III § 1.
160. See Marathon Oil, 145 F.3d at 216.
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the other hand, is a waivable right that protects the individual. 6 ' The court
therefore deemed personal jurisdiction a limitation less fundamental than subject
matter jurisdiction. 62 Furthermore, the court reasoned, to allow federal courts to
rule on personal jurisdiction without first determining the propriety of jurisdiction
over the subject matter would usurp the states' power to adjudicate controversies
that might properly belong in state courts. 163 The preclusive effect of a federal
ruling would be offensive to the states where the case was not properly before the
federal court.164
The Supreme Court finally granted certiorari and reversed the Fifth Circuit's
decision on May 17, 1999.165 Justice Ginsberg delivered the opinion for the
unanimous Court. The opinion first acknowledged Steel Co. as the backdrop for
Ruhrgas.'66 In Steel Co., the Court held that Article III requires a court to
establish jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case before reaching the merits. 6 7
Justice Ginsberg noted that the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted Steel Co. as teaching
that courts must establish subject matter jurisdiction before reaching the issue of
personal jurisdiction. 6"
The Court then acknowledged and characterized the distinctions between
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. 69 The opinion began on the
same premise on which the Fifth Circuit based its reasoning: subject matter
jurisdiction is necessary to keep the federal courts within constitutional and
congressional bounds, while personal jurisdiction is a matter of personal liberty. 70
However, the Court then diverged from the Fifth Circuit by intimating that subject
matter jurisdiction is not necessarily more fundamental than personal
jurisdiction. 171 Justice Ginsberg pointed out that the defective subject matter
jurisdiction-lack of diversity of citizenship-urged by Marathon rested on statutory
construction'72 rather than constitutional mandate.' 73
161. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982)
(noting that personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction "may be intentionally waived, or for
various reasons a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue").
162. See Marathon Oil, 145 F.3d at 217-20.
163. Seeid. at218.
164. Seeid. at218-19.
165. Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil, 526 U.S. 573, 583 (1999).
166. Id. at 577.
167. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 99 (1998).
168. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1994).
173. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584.
Justice Ginsburg then addressed the concern that a federal court's dismissal
of a removed case for lack of personal jurisdiction may preclude the state courts
from reaching the same issue. Marathon argued that because of this preclusive
effect, the determination of personal jurisdiction in a removed case was more
offensive to the dignity of the states. 74 The Court resolved this concern by
demonstrating that a remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction could carry
with it a similarly preclusive effect to the state courts.'75 The Court adopted the
reasoning of Judge Higginbotham's dissent in the Fifth Circuit case.'76 Judge
Higginbotham pointed out that the "dualistic" nature of our state and federal court
systems allows the federal courts to make decisions that preclude adjudication of
issues in the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.177
Justice Ginsburg balanced federalism concerns with state interests. She
suggested that "cooperation and comity" are essential to the federal system. 17 8 The
Court admitted that when questions of personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction can be resolved with equal clarity, courts should first establish the
propriety of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 179 The Court held, however, that
there was no "unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy."'8 ° When a federal court faces
a removed case in which there is a clear issue of personal jurisdiction and a more
complex question of subject matter jurisdiction, the court may properly dismiss the
case based solely on a lack of personal jurisdiction. 8'
C. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
1 8 2
The Supreme Court had occasion to clarify its holding in Steel Co. with
another 1999 case: Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.'83 In Ortiz, the Court granted
certiorari to another case from the Fifth Circuit." 4 At issue in this case was the
question of whether to certify a class of plaintiffs in ongoing litigation against a
manufacturer of asbestos-containing products.'85 Of the several subclasses of
plaintiffs in this complex case, the "exposure only" group was the most
controversial. The Fifth Circuit certified the plaintiff class under Rule
174. See id. at 585.
175. See id. at 585-86.
176. See id. at 586.
177. See Marathon Oil v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 145 F.3d 211,232 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998).
178. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. 586 ("Cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict, are essential to the
federal design.").
179. See id. at 587-88.
180. Id. at 578.
181. Id. at 588.
182. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
183. Id.
184. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (1998), rev'd sub nom. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815 (1999).
185. Ortiz, 527 U.S., at 821.
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23(b)(1)(B).186
Judge Smith, who delivered the majority opinion in Marathon Oil, dissented
from the decision upholding certification. Judge Smith cited the Rules Enabling
Act (REA) for the proposition that rules of civil procedure "shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right."' 87 The dissent believed that certification
of the class in this case would abridge the substantive rights of plaintiffs who did
not opt into the class.'88 Perhaps more important for the dissent in the Fifth
Circuit case was the argument that the "exposure only" plaintiffs had no Article
III standing to come before the federal court.'89 According to the dissent, this
group of plaintiffs suffered no "injury in fact," but rather a "conjectural" injury,
and therefore, there was no case or controversy before the court."9 For Judge
Smith, this disregard of the Article III standing requirements and the Rules
Enabling Act limitations amounted to an unlawful expansion of the power of
federal courts.' 9
In a brief to the Supreme Court in Ortiz, Professor Lawrence H. Tribe
expressed similar concerns."g Professor Tribe argued that the class action was a
feigned proceeding initiated by Fibreboard and several cooperative plaintiffs'
lawyers in order to bar future claimants from bringing suits under various state
laws.'93 Professor Tribe cited Steel Co. for the proposition that "[r]elief that does
not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court."'94
Professor Tribe echoed Judge Smith's dissenting opinion that the "exposure only"
plaintiffs had no injury in fact; therefore, lacking Article III standing, the federal
court had no jurisdiction to certify the class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."' Additionally, argued Professor Tribe, the application of Rule
23 in this case acted as an abridgement of the plaintiffs rights in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act.'"
While the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and ordered the
186. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d at 670; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (1998) ("An action may
be maintained as a class action if... adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest .....
187. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994); In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d at 676.
188. See In reAsbestos i'tig., 134 F.3d at 674.
189. Id. at 675
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Brief for Petitioners at 44-50, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (No. 97-1704).
193. Id. at 44.
194. Id. at 47; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).
195. See Brief for Petitioners at 48-49, Ortiz (No. 97-1704).
196. Id. at 31-36.
decertification of the class, the Court expressly rejected these arguments set forth
by Judge Smith and Professor Tribe.'97 The Court held instead that, while it was
proper for a federal court to examine the issue of class certification before finding
Article III standing, the class failed to meet the criteria within Rule 23.198 The
Court also found that certification of the class would not violate the Rules
Enabling Act.'99 The majority reasoned that the issue of class certification was
purely procedural and therefore did not implicate any substantive right protected
by the Act.2"° The Court characterized class certification as an issue of statutory
standing, which, as in Steel Co., courts may properly examine before Article III
standing.2 °'
Justice Souter delivered the majority opinion in Ortiz.2 2 The argument
advanced by Justice Souter regarding the propriety of a federal court treating an
issue of class certification before addressing Article III concerns seems somewhat
conclusory. The justification offered in the majority opinion is simple: "[A] Rule
23 question should be treated first because class certification issues are 'logically
antecedent' to Article III concerns."'2 3 Justice Souter did not explain how or why
class certification is "logically antecedent" to the constitutional standing
requirement, but rather merely cited Amchem Products v. Windsor" for this
proposition.205
The reference toAmchem, however, reveals little about what logic justifies the
subordination of Article III to the issue of class certification. Amchem, decided
two years before Ortiz, involved similar asbestos related class certification
issues.' An examination of the Amchem passage cited in Ortiz reveals that the
Court in Amchem was equally conclusory in its reasoning: "[B]ecause their
resolution here is logically antecedent to the existence of any Article III issues, it
is appropriate to reach them first."2 7 The Amchem Court suggested that because
197. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 815, 831 (1999).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 845.
200. Id. at 848.
201. Id. at 831.
202. See id. at 821.
203. Id. at 816 (citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612 (1997)).
204. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
205. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 816.
206. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821. In both Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme
Court held that a federal court may decide the issue of whether to certify a class under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure before that court determines whether it has proper jurisdiction to hear the
subject matter of a case. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612-13. In both cases, the Court
dismissed the class actions because they failed to meet the criteria of Rule 23 under which such an action
may be brought. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 848-63; Amchem, 521 U.S. at 613-29. Though Amchem, a 1997 case,
came before Steel Co., the Court in Steel Co. was mysteriously silent on this aspect of the holding in
Amchem. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). The Court in Ortiz, conversely,
distinguished the class action certification issue from the merits in Steel Co. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831.
The Court stated that the issue of class certification is purely procedural, and therefore a court may rule on
the certification issue before deciding the issue of Article III standing. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831.
207. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 612 (citations omitted).
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the Article III standing issue "would not exist but for the [class-action]
certification," and "the class certification issues are dispositive" of the case, the
class certification should be dealt with first.2 8 That explanation sounds "logical,"
but it fails to address the concern which forms the root of the controversy: federal
courts adjudicating the rights of litigants whose cases do not belong in federal
court.
The Amchem Court justified this position through a comparison with
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona.209 Arizonans presented the Court with
an amendment to the Arizona constitution which mandated that English be the
"language of . . all government functions and actions." '210  A government
employee sued in federal court, challenging the amendment as contradictory to the
United States Constitution.211 In the course of litigation, the employee quit her
government job.2 12 The Court held that once the employee stopped working for the
government, the amendment had no effect on her, and the Court was therefore
obligated to dismiss her claim as moot under the Article III justiciable controversy
requirement. 2 3 The problem with Amchem's comparison to this case is that
Arizonans stood for respecting the boundaries of Article 111,214 while Amchem
sought to step around Article III requirement by holding statutory considerations
higher." 5
Arizonans preserved the integrity of the federal system in that it merely
resolved the issue of whether a cause of action amounted to ajusticiable case under
the United States Constitution.26 Such a ruling does not offend the state courts'
authority, as the power of a federal court to decide whether there is a case or
controversy derives from the Constitution. 27 Amchem, on the other hand, opened
a dangerous window through which federal courts may reach statutory issues in
lieu of following constitutional guidelines. 8 Ortiz followed Amchem. Even
though the issues in Amchem and Ortiz might be purely procedural, these rulings
still have a preclusive effect on the litigants. 219 While these purely procedural
208. Id. (citing Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 623 (3d Cir. 1996).
209. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
210. See id. at 48 (citing ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 1(1), 1(2)).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. Seeid. at67.
215. Cf Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. at 591, 612-13 (1997).
216. See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 48-49.
217. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
218. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 591.
219. See Idleman, supra note 3, at 306 n.305 (noting that various state courts have policies in place to
take judicial notice of decisions in federal courts).
rights are not protected by the Rules Enabling Act, some may view the
adjudication of cases which are improperly before the federal court as
encroachments on the states' jurisdiction.22 °
IV. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION
Steel Co., Ruhrgas, and Ortiz each represent the Supreme Court's attempt to
resolve the persistent problems that arise when federal courts dismiss cases on
other issues without establishing jurisdiction.22 ' One might think that the
decisions in these cases, along with Arizonans and Amchem, would be enough to
sufficiently clarify the Court's position on the issue of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. However, the recent case of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.222 highlights the jurisdictional problems that
persist after this line of cases.
Laidlaw illustrates how the Court's pendulous position (on the issue of when
it may be acceptable to assume jurisdiction) has created an uncertainty that is
counter-productive to the end of judicial economy. Laidlaw, like Arizonans and
Steel Co., dealt with the issue of what happens when courts decide statutory
standing before Article III standing.223 In Laidlaw, the Fourth Circuit held that the
plaihtiff's request for declaratory relief under the Clean Water Act became moot
when Laidlaw discontinued discharging mercury into the North Tyger River.224
The court, relying on Arizonans, therefore dismissed the case on the issue of
mootness without determining whether the plaintiff had standing under Article
Ill.2" The Supreme Court reversed, holding a claim for declaratory or injunctive
relief was not moot where the activity could theoretically recur.226
Because the Fourth Circuit thought the claim was moot, the court dismissed
it without examining whether the claimant had standing under Article Ill.227 The
court was wrong. Because of this oversight, the Supreme Court felt obliged to
spend five pages of its decision in Laidlaw examining the issue of Article III
standing.2 28 Although the Court has discretion to examine issues sua sponte, it
would have been easier to review a decision of the Fourth Circuit on the Article
III issue than to examine the question de novo. In this particular case, the effect
of the lower court passing on a jurisdictional issue was to leave the question
entirely for the Supreme Court to decide. The reliance on this proposition that
constitutional standing can be bypassed in the name of judicial economy caused
220. See supra Part IIIB.
221. See supra Part III.
222. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
223. See id. at 700.
224. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306-07 (4th Cir.
1998).
225. Id.
226. See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 711.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 703-08.
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an uneconomical effect in this case.
This problem in Laidlaw is analogous to the larger problem of hypothetical
jurisdiction. Even Steel Co., the case that supposedly put an end to hypothetical
jurisdiction, allowed federal courts to decide issues that are so easy or patently
without merit that a court may reach them while ignoring the constitutional
boundaries of Article 111.229 Laidlaw illustrates the problem: maybe the court is
wrong on what it thinks is an easy issue. 23" The Supreme Court has left to the
federal courts the power to make these determinations, knowing that the courts
could occasionally be mistaken in their interpretations of the law.231
Other evidence of the inefficiency of the Court's position on hypothetical
jurisdiction can be seen empirically in the number of times the Court felt
compelled to review the Article III issues in just the past few years.232 An absolute
requirement of establishing subject matter jurisdiction first-closer to McCardle
and the Fifth Circuit-may be responsible for a decreased amount of litigation on
this issue.23' A rule that would force federal judges to decide the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction before reaching any other matter would be the simplest rule for
the lower courts to interpret.
The simplicity of such a rule, as that in McCardle, would likely reduce the
amount of litigation on complicated issues that arise when judges assume
jurisdiction. The assumption of jurisdiction was at issue in each of the cases
discussed in this Comment, many of which have been decided since just 19 9 7 .
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Steel Co. was perhaps the most efficient, after
all.
Another risk of hypothetical jurisdiction is the tendency of litigants to engage
229. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998).
230. See Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. at 693.
231. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89.
232. E.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (holding that courts must
respect boundaries of Article III jurisdiction); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (stating
that class certification issues were logically antecedent to the existence of Article III jurisdiction and thus
could be dealt with first); Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (declining to endorse the doctrine of hypothetical
jurisdiction); Ruhrgas, A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999) (holding that no jurisdictional
hierarchy requires adjudication of subject matter jurisdiction issues prior to a personal jurisdiction
challenge); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (concluding that courts can determine Rule 23
questions prior to Article III considerations); Laidlaw, 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000) (holding that a claim for
declaratory or injunctive relief is not moot where the activity could theoretically recur).
233. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 511 (1868) ("The first question necessarily is that of
jurisdiction.").
234. See supra note 232.
in "forum shopping" in order to receive a ruling on an issue from what they might
perceive as a more sympathetic judge.235 Perhaps this tendency motivated the
defendants in Ruhrgas to remove the case to federal court in order to increase their
chances of receiving a favorable ruling on their challenge to personal
jurisdiction.236 This practice abuses the resources of the federal system and takes
advantage of a mechanism which is supposed to foster greater fairness to the
parties.237
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to offer any real comfort for these
concerns. Justice Ginsberg's assertion in Ruhrgas that "[c]ooperation and comity,
not competition and conflict, are essential to the federal design" ignores an
important aspect of the American justice system: the autonomy of the individual
states.238 Early Federalists and framers of the Constitution, such as Madison and
Hamilton, saw the maintenance of these two "competing" facets of government as
essential to a free and autonomous society.
239
Baker v. General Motors Corp. presents, by analogy, a rule that could resolve
the persistent problem of hypothetical jurisdiction.2 4° In Baker, a Michigan court
entered an injunction which prevented a former GM employee from testifying
against the company in any litigation.24 The Supreme Court held that Article IV
did not require a Missouri court to give full faith and credit to the Michigan
ruling. 2  The Court reasoned that because the ruling was on a purely procedural
enforcement measure rather than a final judgement, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause did not force another state to recognize the ruling. 3 In dicta, the Court
stated that even as to final judgements, full faith and credit applies only if the
rendering state established proper jurisdiction over the subject matter.'
Both sides of the debate over where to draw the federal subject matter
jurisdiction line voice valid concerns."4s Judicial economy and the dignity of the
individual states are both important concepts in American jurisprudence.246 The
Supreme Court in Steel Co. firmly stated that courts must resolve challenges to
235. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636-37 (1964) (disfavoring defendants' practice of
seeking a change in the law by removing to another forum).
236. See RuhrgasAG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 587 (1999) (acknowledging respondent's
argument that a discretionary rule which permits courts to rule on the issue of personal jurisdiction prior
to establishing subject matter jurisdiction will encourage state court defendants to abuse the federal system
with "opportunistic removals").
237. See Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636-38.
238. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 586. Cooperation and comity are terms that suggest the voluntary nature
of interjurisdictional respect. Here Justice Ginsburg seems to mandate this respect. See id.
239. See MON'IEsQUIEU, supra note 19.
240. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
241. Id. at 228-29.
242. Id. at 239-40.
243. Id. at 237-41.
244. See id. at 233.
245. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) ("[T]he weighty
policies ofjudicial economy and fairness to parties were in themselves strong counsel for the adoptions of
a rule which would permit federal courts to dispose of the state as well as the federal claims.").
246. Id.
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subject matter jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits of the case.247 This line
seems clear enough. The problem arises where there are challenges to other
issues, such as personal jurisdiction and class certification, which are not
considered "merits.""24  Although the Court allows adjudication on these
"procedural" issues, the rulings can have effects on the litigants as profound as
rulings on the merits.249
The Court was correct at least in allowing federal courts to dismiss a case for
lack of personal jurisdiction." Case law, judicial doctrine, and the Constitution
support this concept.5 Yet, the Court may have gone too far in allowing rule-
based analysis in a class action suit before establishing proper jurisdiction. 52
There were, however, compelling arguments in favor of this practice in Ortiz."53
While the Court has struggled to reach a middle ground in the debate surrounding
hypothetical jurisdiction," it could reach a position more accommodating to both
sides.
The solution is to continue to allow federal courts to rule on issues before
resolving challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, while at the same time carving
out an exception to the doctrine of res judicata. If the law allows state courts to
litigate issues already determined by a federal court that never had jurisdiction
over the subject matter, this practice would preserve the autonomy of the state
courts and allow federal courts to dispose of cases in the most efficient manner.
This solution is a simple way of resolving the hypothetical jurisdiction
247. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
248. See Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999) (permitting federal courts to
address personal jurisdiction challenges before establishing subject matterjurisdiction); Ortiz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) (permitting court determination of an issue of class certification first).
249. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831.
250. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588.
251. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that a personal judgment was invalid
against a non-resident of the state who was not personally served within the state); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that in order to subject a defendant to ajudgment he must have
"minimum contacts" with the forum state); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
252. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
253. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831.
254. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
problem. Occam's razor teaches that the simplest solution is usually the best. 5
It is useful to apply this principal to the complex area of the law represented by the
intersection between hypothetical jurisdiction and interjurisdictional preclusion.256
It is ironic that, in the name of judicial economy, the modern Supreme Court
created such a complicated body of law for federal courts to apply in disposing
properly of their cases.257 The rule suggested by the Fifth Circuit in Ruhrgas
(subject matter jurisdiction before anything else)258 is simpler and more consistent
with the text of the Constitution259 than the sometimes difficult test of
characterizing an issue as one of merits or procedure. 260 Such a simple, absolute
rule requiring that federal courts examine their Article III subject matter
jurisdiction before ruling on any other issue (in the spirt of McCardle)261 would
eliminate the risks of improper interjurisdictional preclusion.
The Court is right, however, that sometimes the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction can be more difficult and time consuming for a court to decide than
other issues.262 The Court's instinct is logical; federal courts should be allowed to
dismiss their cases on the simplest procedural issue possible. 263 The remedy for
this luxury of dismissing a case on the simplest basis is also simple: if Article III
jurisdiction is not established, the state courts should not be precluded from
making their own determination of issues that belong in their courts. 2 4 To carve
out such an exception to the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to only be fair to the
states, while allowing federal courts to dismiss cases on the simplest procedural
issue is only fair to the federal system.265
The principle which would make this solution economical is the old concept
of comity.26 If the issues that federal courts decided were truly clear, the state
courts would likely decline to re-examine those issues even though they would not
be legally precluded from doing so. 267
The voluntary nature of this acceptance of the ruling of another jurisdiction
keeps the dignity of the state courts in tact and the power of the federal courts
255. See WEBSTER'sTHIRDNEWINTERNATIONALDICIONARY 1561 (1986) (defining Occam's razor as
"the philosophic rule that entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily").
256. See Chauffeurs Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,575 (1996) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("The time has come for us to borrow William of Occam's razor and sever this portion of
our analysis.").
257. See GLANNON, supra note 2 and accompanying text; Burbank, supra note I I and accompanying
text.
258. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1997).
259. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 511 (1868).
260. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
261. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. at 511.
262. See Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999).
263. See id.
264. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (stating that only those judgments
rendered by courts with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter gain nationwide force).
265. See Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 588.
266. See supra note I.
267. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent struggle to define the boundaries of federal
subject matter jurisdiction produced some guidelines for federal courts. The Court
held that it is usually preferable to decide subject matter jurisdiction before
anything else.2" However, where other procedural issues arise, the court has
discretion to treat them first.269 Where the merits are extremely obvious, a court
may even rule on the merits without proper jurisdiction. z0 The primary goal of
the Supreme Court is clear: judicial economy. Concerns of economy and
simplicity, however, should not be held higher than the preservation of the
Constitution. In addition, this search for economy has sometimes yielded an
uneconomical effect.27'
However, the paradox is close to resolution. When the Court tells the lower
courts that they can dismiss cases on the simplest grounds before establishing their
jurisdiction without causing a preclusive effect, the arguments of both sides of the
debate will quiet. A simple reading of the passage in Baker, which stated that full
faith and credit shall be given to judgements only "if rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons governed by the
judgement," should be enough to discourage forum shopping and dispel the idea
that federal courts are usurping state power.272 For the states' part, common sense
and logic will surely lead them to accept the decisions reached in federal courts
without taking the time to reexamine obvious issues. Respecting the text of the
Constitution is of paramount importance; the principle of comity, in regard to
hypothetical jurisdiction, will ensure that paying that respect does not compromise
268. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
269. See Ruhrgas A.G. v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815 (1999).
270. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89.
271. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
272. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (emphasis added).
the virtue of judicial economy.
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